The Union as it Wasn\u27t and the Constitution as it Isn\u27t: Section Five and Altering the Balance of Power by Reilly, Elizabeth
The University of Akron
IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Publications The School of Law
January 2009
The Union as it Wasn't and the Constitution as it
Isn't: Section Five and Altering the Balance of
Power
Elizabeth Reilly
University of Akron School of Law, reilly@uakron.edu
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/ua_law_publications
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Legal History Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The School of Law at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Publications by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.
Recommended Citation
Elizabeth Reilly, The Union as it Wasn't and the Constitution as it Isn't: Section Five and Altering the Balance of Power,
42 Akron Law Review 1081 (2009).
REILLY_ARTICLE_FINALFINALFINAL.DOC 6/30/2009 3:42 PM 
 
1081 
 
THE UNION AS IT WASN’T AND THE CONSTITUTION AS 
IT ISN’T: SECTION FIVE AND ALTERING THE BALANCE 
OF POWERS 
Elizabeth Reilly∗ 
Much [has been] said about the Union as it was and the Constitution as 
it is.  [I] want[] the Union as it wasn’t and the Constitution as it isn’t. 
 
— Andrew Jackson Hamilton urging ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment1 
 I.   Introduction ..................................................................... 1081 
 II.   The Importance of Section Five ...................................... 1084 
 III.   Conclusion ....................................................................... 1107 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The original prototype of Section One of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as introduced by its primary Framer, John Bingham of 
Ohio,2 read: 
 
∗ Associate Dean and McDowell Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law.  I would 
like to thank Richard Aynes, Wilson Huhn, and Sarah Cravens for their comments and assistance on 
earlier drafts.  Despite their best efforts, if any historical or other errors appear, they are solely my 
responsibility. 
 1. Governor Hamilton of Texas, speaking in Trenton, New Jersey about the central issue of 
the 1866 campaign.  MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE 137 (1986) (citing New 
York Daily Tribune, Sept. 11, 1866, at 5, cols 1-2). 
 2. Bingham originally introduced the idea of an amendment of this type on December 6, 
1865.  JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 48 (1956) (citing  CONG. 
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st  Sess. 14  (1865)).  The Globe reports that Bingham introduced a “joint 
resolution to amend the Constitution of the United States so as to empower Congress to pass all 
necessary and proper laws to secure to all persons in every State of the Union equal protection in 
their rights, life, liberty, and property . . . .”  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1865).  It was 
referred to committee.  Id.  The Joint Committee reported out this version in February 1866, a week 
after Johnson had vetoed the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill.  JAMES, supra at 84. 
REILLY_ARTICLE_FINALFINALFINAL.DOC 6/30/2009  3:42 PM 
1082 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:1081 
The Congress shall have the power to make all laws which shall be 
necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all 
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, and to all 
persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life, 
liberty, and property.3 
Bingham went on to note expressly that “save the words conferring 
the express grant of power to the Congress,” the principles of the rights 
were already in the Constitution.4  Had the power been given to 
Congress to enforce obedience to those principles, Bingham maintained 
that “that rebellion” would have been “an impossibility.”5  Nonetheless, 
that power had been withheld “by every construction of the Constitution, 
its contemporaneous construction, its continued construction, legislative, 
executive, and judicial.”6  Adherence to those “immortal bill of rights” 
had up to that point rested solely upon “the fidelity of the States.”7  In 
Bingham’s mind, the power in Congress to enforce the rights was not 
only “the want of the Republic,” but also “absolutely essential to 
American nationality.”8  On behalf of the Joint Committee on 
Reconstruction, Bingham recommended the Amendment “for the 
purpose of giving to the whole people the care in future of the unity of 
the Government which constitutes us one people, and without which 
American nationality would cease to be.”9 
Thus did the Amendment and its framers herald the importance of 
Congress to meeting the purposes of the Amendment, especially the 
purposes of its grants of individual rights.  Consistent with Republican 
legal and political ideology of the time,10 the necessity of congressional 
power and an affirmative grant of that power infused the Amendment 
from its inception. 
Nonetheless, concern about restricting the role of Congress was 
raised in the first case in which the Supreme Court interpreted the 
Amendment, Slaughter-House Cases,11 despite its inapplicability to its 
 
 3. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. CURTIS, supra note 1, exhaustively documents the content of Republican ideology, 
especially at pp. 26-56. 
 11. 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1873) (dicta intimating limits on Section Five power such as the state 
action limitation as well as on subjects for equality legislation: “If, however, the States did not 
conform their laws to [the] requirements [of the equal protection clause], then by the fifth section of 
REILLY_ARTICLE_FINALFINALFINAL.DOC 6/30/2009  3:42 PM 
2009] THE UNION AS IT WASN’T 1083 
facts.  The restrictions intimated in Slaughter-House were imposed only 
three years later in United States v. Cruikshank.12  In both instances, 
preservations of state power in the federal system and concerns about 
congressional vs. state power to define and protect rights underlay the 
reasoning.  Recently, one of the most important and contentious issues in 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence relates to Section Five of the 
Amendment and Congress’ power with respect to individual rights.  The 
Court continues to impose significant restraints on federalism grounds.13  
But current decisions also specifically raise separation of powers 
concerns when determining the reach of the congressional Section Five 
power.14  Therefore, it is important to explore Section Five from the 
separation of powers perspective.  I argue that the power conferred also 
encompassed a re-envisioning of the roles and boundaries of judicial and 
legislative power vis-à-vis individual rights. 
 Throughout the debates during the framing and ratification of the 
Amendment, an understanding of the need to recast the Union was 
coupled with the understanding that to do so, the Constitution itself 
needed to repudiate doctrines that had undermined both union and 
liberty.15  This article argues that in reconstituting that Union, the 39th 
Congress and the Fourteenth Amendment not only altered the 
fundamental structural principles of the relationship between the states 
and the national government and the responsibility of government to 
protect individual liberties.  It argues that the original structural 
 
the article of amendment Congress was authorized to enforce it by suitable legislation.  We doubt 
very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes 
as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision.  
It is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency, that a strong case would be necessary 
for its application to any other.  But as it is a State that is to be dealt with, and not alone the validity 
of its laws, we may safely leave that matter until Congress shall have exercised its power, or some 
case of State oppression, by denial of equal justice in its courts, shall have claimed a decision at our 
hands.”). 
 12. 92 U.S. 542, 554-55 (1876) (applying a state action requirement to validate indictments 
under the Civil Rights Act, impliedly creating that as a restriction on Congress’s power to legislate 
to enforce the due process and the equal protection clauses: “The fourteenth amendment prohibits a 
State from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; but this 
adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another.  It simply furnishes an additional 
guaranty against any encroachment by the States . . . .”). 
 13.  See infra text accompanying notes 30 and 31, and note 17. 
 14.  See, e.g.,  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 525 (1997). 
 15.  See, e.g., id. Chapters 3 and 5.  Curtis quotes the illuminating argument of Governor 
Hamilton in this respect: “‘He wanted a Union of loyal men in which all, even the humblest, can 
exercise the rights of American freemen every where . . . . Any other [Union] than one which 
guaranteed these fundamental rights was worthless to him.’”  Id. at 137 (quoting New York Daily 
Tribune, Sept. 11, 1866, at 5, cols 1-2). 
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alignment of national powers and the boundaries of their respective 
spheres were also, of necessity and by understanding, recast as well. 
II.  THE IMPORTANCE OF SECTION FIVE 
Scholars have painstakingly revealed the intended shift in power 
from the states to the federal government to define and enforce 
individual rights in the Fourteenth Amendment.16  The thoughtful – and 
wary – Framers were so thorough that they made certain to presciently – 
 
 16. Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627 (1994) [hereinafter Aynes, 
Justice Miller]; Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 
103 YALE L.J. 57 (1993) [hereinafter Aynes, John Bingham]; Garrett Epps, Second Founding: The 
Story of the Fourteenth Amendment, 85 OR. L. REV. 895 (2006); Garrett Epps, The Antebellum 
Political Background of the Fourteenth Amendment, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175  (Summer 
2004) [hereinafter Epps, Antebellum Political Background]; Robert Kaczorowski, Revolutionary 
Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 916 
(1986) [hereinafter Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism] (“The framers understood the 
fundamental rights of citizenship to be the privileges and immunities of United States citizens, and 
therefore believed Congress could proffer a change in the Constitution that would fundamentally 
redefine the nature of American federalism.”).  Kaczorowski notes this intended restriction of state 
powers to be guaranteed by federal protection of the rights, but also notes it was not a 
nationalization that overrode a federal character to the union.  Id. at 885-90 (detailing the 
antebellum political theory of national citizenship and the rights it guaranteed, and noting that 
Taney’s acceptance of that theory required him in Dred Scott to find that blacks could not be 
citizens; the actions taken pursuant to that decision [denying national citizenship and the protection 
of rights] led to the Republican commitment to the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights 
Acts as necessary to supplant state power with national power in order to protect national rights 
through national citizenship and congressional authority); id. at 939-40 (“Because they believed that 
the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments directly secured the civil rights of United States citizens, 
federal legislators, judges, and attorneys understood that these amendments conclusively established 
that the national government possessed both primary authority over civil rights and ultimate 
responsibility for safeguarding citizens’ civil rights.  Despite this view, Republican legislators 
retained dual sovereignty and eschewed restructuring the United States into a unitary state. . . . 
[T]he states were expected to safeguard citizens’ rights.  But the national government was 
committed to protecting and enforcing citizens' rights as the need arose.  This concept of federalism 
was radically different from the states’ rights-centered theory espoused by Southerners and 
conservative Democrats, and ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court in the Slaughter-House 
decision. . . . This new system was founded upon the old one.  But, in developing it, Congress 
knowingly and purposely acted to revolutionize the structure of the federal union.”) (emphasis 
added). 
  See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 82 (1873) (“[W]e do not see in those amendments 
any purpose to destroy the main features of the general system.  Under the pressure of all the excited 
feeling growing out of the war, our statesmen have still believed that the existence of the States with 
powers for domestic and local government, including the regulation of civil rights – the rights of 
person and of property – was essential to the perfect working of our complex form of government, 
though they have thought proper to impose additional limitations on the States, and to confer 
additional power on that of the Nation.”). 
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and probably less effectively than they had hoped17 – alter separation of 
powers as well.  In Section Five, they explicitly amended Article I to 
 
 17. There is substantial evidence that the Framers believed that the Thirteenth and the 
Fourteenth Amendments provided Congress with the constitutional power to enact the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 and later-enacted statutes.  See, e.g., David Bogen, Rebuilding the Slaughter-House: 
The Cases’ Support for Civil Rights, 42 AKRON L. REV. 1131, 1137 (2009) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866)) (statement of Rep. Stevens that provisions of Section One of the 
Amendment are all asserted in the organic law already and Constitutional Amendment will prevent 
repeal of the Civil Rights Act).  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866. at 2462 (statement 
of Rep. Garfield that the Amendment was to fix the Civil Rights bill in the Constitution); id. at 2465 
(Rep. Thayer said “it is but incorporating in the Constitution of the United States the principle of the 
Civil Rights bill that has lately become law.”); id. at 2467 (Boyer, opposing the Amendment, said 
“the first section embodies the principles of the civil rights bill.”); id. at 2498 (statement of Rep. 
Broomall that Congress voted for Section One “in another shape, in the civil rights bill.”); id. at 
2502, 2513 (statements of Rep. Raymond; Raymond had voted against the Civil Rights bill as 
beyond congressional power and opposed other sections of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment, 
but supported Section One, saying now the bill “comes before us in the form of an amendment to 
the constitution which purports to give Congress the power to attain this precise result.”). 
  The passage of other legislation pursuant to the Section Five power, soon after its 
ratification and by a Congress composed of many members of the framing 39th Congress, is another 
testament to the belief that the power had been vested.  See Wilson R. Huhn, The Legacy of 
Slaughterhouse, Bradwell, and Cruikshank in Constitutional Interpretation, 42 AKRON L. REV. 
1053, 1074-75 (2009) (“[T]he framers of the 14th Amendment were, in fact, primarily concerned 
with addressing the practices of racial discrimination by private parties and the many acts of private 
violence being visited upon blacks and their white allies in the South . . . Congress enacted statute 
after statute prohibiting that discrimination and punishing that violence – and . . . Congress adopted 
the 14th Amendment with the avowed purpose. . . . to remove any possible doubts about the 
constitutionality of that legislation.”) (internal citations omitted) (hereinafter Huhn, Legacy). 
  The Court’s subsequent declarations of unconstitutionality of those acts would thus appear 
to be in contravention to the Framers’ intent about the scope of the power, and hence a usurpation of 
power by the Court. 
  That later Congresses were cognizant of this misconstruction of their efforts is apparent 
from debates on the Blaine Amendment in 1876: Senator Oliver Morton noted how the Court had 
gutted the Amendment: “The fourteenth and fifteenth amendments which we supposed broad, 
ample, and specific, have, I fear, been very much impaired by construction, and one of them in 
some respects, almost destroyed by construction.  Therefore, I would leave as little as possible to 
construction.  I would make [the proposed provisions of the Blaine amendment] so specific and so 
strong that they cannot be construed away and destroyed by the courts.”  CURTIS, supra note 1 at 
170 (citing 4 CONG. REC. 5585 (1876)). 
  The Section Five power, by extension with the Section Two power in the 15th 
Amendment, received a more liberal reading after 1966.  Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650-
51 (1966) (“[T]he McCulloch v. Maryland standard is the measure of what constitutes ‘appropriate 
legislation’ under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 
301, 326-27 (1966). 
  But the first case to cut it back and to declare a congruence and proportionality test, which 
many believe is being applied more stringently than the necessary and proper test, explicitly 
invoked a structural understanding of separation of powers as limiting Congress’s power.  City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  Boerne limits Section Five congressional power at least as 
much as, if not more than, the Commerce Power has been limited.  In fact, since Congress’s power 
to enact RFRA vis-à-vis the federal government was upheld, it would appear that the Court may 
well be restricting the Section Five power to protect rights more than it restricts the scope of the 
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afford Congress the power to legislate to enforce the Amendment: 
“Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article.”18  That enforcement power revolutionized the 
role of the legislature with respect to individual liberties, thus altering its 
role vis-à-vis the Court as the protector. 
Bingham thought ensuring that Congress had the power to enforce 
rights contained in the Constitution was “the most important issue that 
would come before the Congress.”19  He believed that those rights bound 
the states, but that they were not enforceable, “by every construction of 
the Constitution . . . legislative, executive and judicial”20  Changing that 
interpretation, by changing the Constitution and according power to 
Congress, was a great object of the Amendment.  Legislative power was 
important, because Bingham believed that “enforcement of the bill of 
rights is the want of the Republic,”21 hence his proposed Amendment “to 
arm Congress with the power to compel obedience to the oath [to uphold 
the Constitution, including the guarantees of rights it contained].”22  
Although that congressional power was ultimately located in Section 
Five, nothing indicates that Bingham or Congress believed that the 
relocation diminished or failed to give Congress the power to enforce the 
rights secured by the enhanced Section One.23 
 
necessary and proper clause in evaluating legislation to enforce or define those same rights against 
the federal government.  But see Marci A. Hamilton & David Schoenbrod, The Reaffirmation of 
Proportionality Analysis Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 469 
(1999) (arguing that the congruence and proportionality test is simply a definition of a test 
consistently applied in practice, if not in rhetoric).  It hardly appears that the Section Five power is 
being recognized as an increase in Congress’s enumerated powers, especially vis-à-vis the Court.  It 
is indeed ironic to find that the Section Five power is less expansive than the other powers Congress 
constitutionally possesses. 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.  Much of the debate concerning the need for congressional 
enforcement was focused upon the need for Congress to have power against the states.  See Aynes, 
John Bingham, supra note 16, at 71-74. 
 19. CURTIS, supra note 1, at 62. 
 20. Id. at 63 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 1034 (1866)). 
 21. Id. at 82 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291 (1866)) (reviewing debates 
about the Civil Rights Bill of 1866, which Bingham believed exceeded the constitutional powers of 
Congress to pass, and hence desired an amendment to make clear that power within Congress to 
effectuate all the rights guaranteed by the Constitution). 
 22. Id. 
 23. See text accompanying notes 38-51 infra.  Although the modern Court has made much of 
the shift in language from the Bingham prototype using “secure” to the final wording of Section 
Five using “enforce,” nothing indicates this to have been a substantive change.  Boerne, 521 U.S. at 
520-22.  Rather, Bingham appears to have used the words interchangeably in debating before the 
Congress.  See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess.  813 (1866).  When the language of “secure” 
was in the proposal first on the floor, Bingham responded to an opponent by asking “who are 
opposed to enforcing the written guarantees of the Constitution.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Senator 
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Despite its high purpose and its structural changes to the 
constitutional framework, the Fourteenth Amendment was not 
universally embraced as a vehicle for accomplishing its guarantees.  The 
United States Supreme Court promptly eviscerated much of the meaning 
of Section One.24  Congress, enacting Reconstruction statutes pursuant to 
its interpretation of the power granted to it and in response to the 
morphing abuses of rights being practiced in the former slave states, 
passed a significant number of measures to make those rights real and 
provide protection for their exercise.25  Cruikshank, which struck down 
convictions for violating the Enforcement Act of 1870, introduced both 
the narrowing of congressional power to enforce rights and the state 
action limitation.  It thus signaled limitations not simply upon promoting 
individual rights with federal power, but also on recognizing enhanced 
congressional prerogative to protect those rights.  In the Civil Rights 
Cases, the Court used the state action limitation to strike down 
significant provisions of Congress’s exercises of power to protect civil 
rights.26  Other cases completed the task of severely restricting the reach 
of the Section Five power, striking down the laws passed pursuant to 
that power.27  By 1883, the Amendment appeared to be all but impotent 
 
Howard, introducing the Amendment onto the floor of the Senate after the Joint Committee had 
fashioned it into its current multi-section format, stated that it gave “power on the part of Congress 
to give the [rights in the Constitution] full effect.”  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 2766 (1866).  
Discussing the Civil Rights Bill, Lawrence of Ohio used the words interchangeably, claiming that 
without congressional power to enforce them, Government would be powerless to secure or protect 
rights guaranteed in the Constitution.  CURTIS, supra note 1, at 77-78. 
 24. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873); 
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875). 
 25. E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (originally entitled “An Act to 
protect All Persons in the United States in Their Civil Rights, and furnish the Means of their 
Vindication”); The Enforcement Act of 1870 (The Act of May 31, 1870), ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140 
(1870) (originally entitled “An Act to enforce the rights of citizens of the United States”); Ku Klux 
Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, §2, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (originally entitled “An Act to enforce the 
Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other 
Purposes”); Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, §§3-5, 18 Stat. 336, 337 (1875) (originally entitled 
“An act to protect all citizens in their civil and legal rights”). 
 26. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (finding the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was an 
unconstitutional exercise of power to reach conduct other than state action). 
 27. See Huhn, Legacy, supra note 16, text and note 124 (citing Harris v. United States, 106 
U.S. 629, 640 (1883) (declaring provision of Ku Klux Klan Act unconstitutional, as “directed 
exclusively against the action of private persons, without reference to the laws of the States, or their 
administration by [the] officers [of the state] . . . .”)); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) 
(striking down Civil Rights Act of 1875); Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887) (following 
Harris in finding the Ku Klux Klan Act to be unconstitutional insofar as it applies to private action); 
Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 14 (1906) (overturning convictions of a group of individuals 
for interfering with the civil rights of other individuals in violation of Civil Rights Act of 1866, in 
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as a source of congressional power, federal power, and individual 
rights.28 
Congress resurrected the Amendment as a source of power to 
guarantee rights during the Civil Rights era of the 1960s, using the 
Commerce Power to support its legislation.  A much-altered Supreme 
Court upheld those statutes, and began to articulate an interpretation of 
Section Five (and its companion Section Two of the Fifteenth 
Amendment) that accorded power to Congress to resolve existing 
problems to the guarantees of rights through far-reaching legislation.29 
The recent Supreme Court decisions defining the scope of the 
Section Five power limit congressional power to interpret, define, or 
create rights.  Instead, the Court describes that power as one to decree 
remedies for persistent state violations of recognized constitutional 
rights.30  The cases taken together stand for the propositions that 1) 
 
part because the statute could not be grounded upon the Fourteenth Amendment because “no action 
on the part of the state is complained of . . . .”). 
 28. Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause and Revising the 
Slaughter-House Cases Without Exhuming Lochner: Individual Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 38 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1996) (“The destruction of the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
and the development of an excessively broad state action doctrine had a profound impact on 
American history.  They represented a one-two punch that did much to eliminate the Fourteenth 
Amendment as an effective protector of individual rights and democracy.  Both were motivated in 
part by considerations of federalism, and in both cases the judicial solution was far broader than 
necessary.”). 
 29. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650-51 (1966) (“[T]he McCulloch v. Maryland 
standard is the measure of what constitutes ‘appropriate legislation’ under § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326-27 (1966).  The cases were 
understood to create a “ratchet theory,” whereby Congress had the power to legislate to protect and 
enforce rights in excess of what were considered to be the minimal, or fundamental baseline, rights 
recognized and enforced by the Court. 
 30. E.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (Title I of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625-27 (2000) 
(Violence Against Women Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 86, 91 (2000) (Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense 
Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 674 (1999) (Trademark Remedy Clarification Act); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary 
Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647-48 (1999) (Patent and Plant Variety 
Protection Remedy Clarification Act); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532, 536 (Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act).  Although the Court upheld congressional exercises of power in two cases, both 
relied heavily upon distinctive fundamental rights already recognized by the Court and empirical 
findings by Congress that the states were problematic actors in inhibiting those rights.  Nev. Dep’t 
of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 735 (2003) (holding that the Family and Medical Leave Act 
family leave provisions are constitutional as applied to states on the basis of “the States’ record of 
unconstitutional participation in, and fostering of, gender-based discrimination in the administration 
of leave benefits . . . [resting the holding] on congressional findings that, at the time the FMLA was 
enacted, States ‘relied on invalid gender stereotypes in the employment context, specifically in the 
administration of leave benefits.’”); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004) (holding Title II 
of the Americans With Disabilities Act, requiring states to provide access to buildings, valid as 
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Congress may only enact remedies to enforce a Court-understood 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; 2) the prescribed remedy must 
be congruent with and proportionate to empirical evidence and findings 
of state violations, or be a prophylaxis against state violations found to 
occur and to need prevention by a prophylaxis; 3) the legislation must 
operate against state action only, and 4) Congress must use statutory 
language that is unmistakably clear about the intent to explicitly override 
state sovereign immunity as embodied in the Eleventh Amendment. 
These decisions have revitalized scholarship on the original and 
historical meaning of the Section Five grant of power.31 
This article aims to contribute to that conversation by looking at 
historical, philosophical, legal, and pragmatic sources to illuminate the 
purposes of the Amendment with respect to the balancing of powers 
among the respective spheres of the branches of national government.  
Section Five32 was a revolutionary grant of power to Congress, not 
simply in the federalism context.  I argue that it profoundly reconceived 
the role of the national legislature vis-à-vis individual rights.  It was not 
merely a sharp departure from previous constitutional theory but also 
used the lessons of history to turn that theory on its head. 
 
applied to court buildings because access to the building was necessary in support of the 
fundamental right of access to the courts, stating “Title II unquestionably is valid § 5 legislation as it 
applies to the class of cases implicating the accessibility of judicial services . . . .”). 
 31. E.g., Robert Kaczorowski, The Supreme Court and Congress’s Power To Enforce 
Constitutional Rights: An Overlooked Moral Anomaly, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 153 (2004) 
[hereinafter Kaczorowski, The Supreme Court]; Robert Kaczorowski, Congress’s Power To Enforce 
Fourteenth Amendment Rights: Lessons From Federal Remedies the Framers Enacted, 42 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 187 (2005) [hereinafter Kaczorowski, Congress’s Power]; Michael McConnell, 
Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 
(1997); Rebecca Zietlow, Congressional Enforcement of Civil Rights and John Bingham’s Theory 
of Citizenship, 36 AKRON L. REV. 717 (2003); Ruth Colker, The Supreme Court’s Historical Errors 
in City of Boerne v. Flores, 43 B.C. L. REV. 783 (2002); James W. Fox, Jr., Re-readings and 
Misreadings: Slaughter-House, Privileges and Immunities, and Section Five Enforcement Powers, 
91 KY. L.J. 67 (2002); Christopher Banks, The Constitutional Politics of Interpreting Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV. 425 (2003); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, 
Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and 
Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003); Owen Fiss, Between Supremacy and Exclusivity, 57 
SYRACUSE L.REV. 187 (2007); Marci Hamilton, What is Rehnquist Federalism?, 155 U. PA. L.REV. 
8 (2007); John Harrison, State Sovereign Immunity and Congress’s Enforcement Powers, 2006 SUP. 
CT. REV. 353; John T. Valauri, McCulloch and the Fourteenth Amendment, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. 
RTS. L. REV. 857 (2004). 
 32. This analysis similarly applies to the analogous Section Two in both the Thirteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2. 
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First, the Framers of the Amendment perceived the Court33 as 
having failed in its role as a bulwark of individual liberties,34 especially 
in Prigg35 and Dred Scott.36  “The framers vividly remembered the 
capture of the judiciary by the Slave Power, and they feared it had not 
yet fully freed itself.”37  The need for Congress to have a recognized and 
active role was so strongly perceived that the original draft of Section 
One proposed by John Bingham was focused on granting Congress the 
power to secure the necessary rights.38 
This reflects a sense that Congress needed to take an active role in 
recognizing and protecting the privileges and immunities of citizenship 
 
 33. Although the Slaughter-House and Cruikshank courts focused exclusively upon state 
failure to protect rights as behind the meaning of the Amendment, the 39th Congress also was 
concerned about the Court’s role in facilitating slavery, e.g., in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 
451-52 (1857) and Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 611 (1842).  See infra text accompanying 
notes 105 to 109.  Epps, Antebellum Political Background, supra note 16, at 210 (“The Slave Power 
reading also casts doubt on any argument that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was 
primarily to empower the federal judiciary and strengthen its role as arbiter of constitutional rights.  
The framers vividly remembered the capture of the judiciary by the Slave Power, and they feared it 
had not yet fully freed itself.  In fact, it seems much more probable Congress intended to grant itself 
a co-equal role with the courts in the clearly political work of defining what constitutes ‘privileges 
and immunities,’ ‘due process of law,’ and ‘equal protection of the laws.’  Congressional statutes 
might set the goals; the courts would enforce them.  Both branches might be involved, but the 
Court’s current vision of itself at the center, with Congress relegated to an occasional role as an 
auxiliary enforcer of court decisions, seems far from what Slave Power-minded framers intended.”). 
 34. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1062 (1866) (statement of Rep. Kelley) (criticizing 
“all that has been done judicially in furtherance of this great wrong” of slavery). 
 35. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 611 (1842) (upholding an exclusive congressional 
power to enact the Fugitive Slave Act under the terms of Article IV and invalidating state laws 
providing due process protections to captured African-Americans). 
 36. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 451- 52 (1857) (striking down Congress’s power to 
regulate the territories by prohibiting slavery in the Missouri Compromise: “[T]he right of property 
in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution.  The right to traffic in it, like an 
ordinary article of merchandise and property, was guarantied to the citizens of the United States, in 
every State that might desire it, for twenty years.  And the Government in express terms is pledged 
to protect it in all future time, if the slave escapes from his owner.  This is done in plain words – too 
plain to be misunderstood.  And no word can be found in the Constitution which gives Congress a 
greater power over slave property, or which entitles property of that kind to less protection than 
property of any other description.  The only power conferred is the power coupled with the duty of 
guarding and protecting the owner in his rights.  Upon these considerations, it is the opinion of the 
court that the act of Congress which prohibited a citizen from holding and owning property of this 
kind in the territory of the United States north of the line therein mentioned, is not warranted by the 
Constitution, and is therefore void; and that neither Dred Scott himself, nor any of his family, were 
made free by being carried into this territory; even if they had been carried there by the owner, with 
the intention of becoming a permanent resident.”). 
 37. Epps,  Antebellum Political Background, supra note 16, at 210. 
 38. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866). 
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and equal protection of the laws, as a first matter.39  As Garrett Epps 
contends, 
it seems much more probable Congress intended to grant itself a co-
equal role with the courts in the clearly political work of defining what 
constitutes “privileges and immunities,” “due process of law,” and 
“equal protection of the laws.”  Congressional statutes might set the 
goals; the courts would enforce them.  Both branches might be 
involved, but the Court’s current vision of itself at the center, with 
Congress relegated to an occasional role as an auxiliary enforcer of 
court decisions, seems far from what Slave Power-minded framers 
intended.40 
In Boerne, the Supreme Court interpreted the elision of Congress 
from Section One and replacement of it in Section Five as an 
enforcement power as evidence that Congress’s power was diminished: 
“no longer plenary but remedial.”41  However, there is no history 
explaining the change that would indicate any substantive alterations.42  
 
 39. See Kaczorowski, The Supreme Court, supra note 31; Kaczorowski, Congress’s Power, 
supra note 31; Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 16. 
 40. Epps, Antebellum Political Background, supra note 16, at 210. 
 41. See, e.g., Boerne, 521 U.S. at 522.  Michael McConnell criticizes the Court’s history and 
argument extensively. McConnell, supra note 31, at 173-75.  The Court argues that the change 
reflected opposition to giving Congress “too much legislative power at the expense of the existing 
constitutional structure.”  Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.  The Court cast its concern in separation of 
power terms: “If Congress could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment's 
meaning . . . .”  Id. at 173 (citing Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529).  McConnell demonstrates that the 
existing structure of concern to both framers and opponents was federalism – the ability to legislate 
directly with respect to the states and hold states directly accountable via injunction or damages 
remedies.  McConnell argues, “Congress did not consider itself limited to enforcing judicially 
determined rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. at 174-75 (citing debates about the scope 
of the Amendment and its power), and concludes that: 
Only the ‘interpretive’ understanding of Section Five adequately explains why the 
Reconstruction Congresses debated at such length over precisely what rights would be 
protected under the several Civil Rights Acts: because their interpretation mattered. . . . 
The historical evidence presented in the Boerne opinion . . . does not support the more 
extreme claim that Congress lacks independent interpretive authority. 
Id. at 176. 
  See Harrison, supra note 31, at 367-69 (2007) (quoting John Bingham and both 
proponents and opponents of the Fourteenth Amendment on whether it enabled Congress to regulate 
the states themselves, in contrast with acting directly against state officers).  The interrelationship of 
Congress’s powers with those of the Court were not directly addressed. Harrison argues at length 
that the history supports the retention of the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity to the states, 
and instead authorized Congress to proceed with legislation that was operative against state actors 
and other individuals, rather than against the states qua states.  Id. at 385. 
 42. See McConnell, supra note 31, at 176-78 (noting that although the Boerne court claims 
the original Section One was tabled, in fact that motion was defeated and Bingham himself asked to 
postpone consideration until April).  The April consideration followed the enactment of the Civil 
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Rather, there appears to have been discussion about whether the 
Necessary and Proper Clause already gave Congress sufficient power to 
restrict the States through legislation on matters within the scope of the 
Amendment, or if Congress needed a direct grant of power to ensure an 
enumerated power undergirded their implied powers to legislate with 
respect to the matters contained in the Amendment.43 
The actual shift of the grant of power from the section guaranteeing 
rights to a separate, last section of the Amendment occurred in the Joint 
Committee on Reconstruction.  It occurred as part of reconceptualizing 
the separate parts of the constitutional changes the Committee was 
proposing into a single, multi-subject amendment to meet the goals of 
Congress and the realities of their being parts of a unified whole.44 
 
Rights Act of 1866 and President Johnson’s veto of that Act.  Id.  McConnell claims that the veto, if 
anything, inspired more radical support for an amendment, rather than dampening Congress’s goals 
with respect to its reach and congressional power.  Id.  See also Colker, supra note 31, at 792-93 
(arguing that the earlier version of the Amendment was postponed). 
 43. Aynes, John Bingham, supra note 16, at 71 (“According to Bingham, Article IV, Section 
2 applied the provisions of the Bill of Rights against the states, but the absence of an express clause 
granting Congress enforcement authority meant that while a compact existed that bound the states to 
comply with Section Two, no remedy was available when the states breached this obligation . . . . 
Bingham’s constitutional theory, the enforcement theory, holds that the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides the enforcement power absent from Article IV, Section 2.”).  Bingham seems most 
concerned about the power to reach the states, understandably since that was the source of the 
problems leading to the Civil War, and hence might not directly have referred to congressional 
power to enforce rights against the national government.  Senator Howard explicitly explained one 
view that congressional power had not otherwise been granted and would not otherwise be expected 
to be read in through the second clause of the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Wilson R. Huhn, 
Congress Has the Power to Enforce the Bill of Rights Against the Federal Government; Therefore 
FISA is Constitutional and the President’s Terrorist Surveillance Program is Illegal, 16 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 537, 545 n.48 (2007) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765-66 
(1866)).  Senator Howard stated: 
The great object of the first section of this amendment is, therefore, to restrain the power 
of the States and compel them at all times to respect these great fundamental guarantees 
[of the Bill of Rights].  How will it be done under the present amendment?  As I have 
remarked, they are not powers granted to Congress, and therefore it is necessary, if they 
are to be effectuated and enforced, as they assuredly ought to be, that additional power 
should be given to Congress to that end. This is done by the fifth section of this 
amendment, which declares that “the Congress shall have power to enforce by 
appropriate legislation the provisions of this article.” 
Id.  Cf. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 16, at 866-67 (1986) (“The most 
important question for the framers was whether the national or the state governments possessed 
primary authority to determine and secure the status and rights of American citizens.”). 
 44. See JAMES, supra note 2,  at  101-104 (documenting the multi-section version proposed by 
Robert Dale Owen to Thaddeus Stevens, who embraced it enthusiastically and took it to the Joint 
Committee, where it also received a favorable reception; noting that Bingham confined his concerns 
and actions to making sure the rights section was sufficiently broad and specific; and positing that 
the move into Section Five provided Bingham with the opportunity to treat Section One for the first 
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Section Five does make the power as stated consistent with the manner 
and language in which the previous Thirteenth and later Fifteenth 
Amendments accorded the power, and technical drafting might account 
for it.  In the Joint Committee, when fashioning the final version of the 
Amendment it would report out, the committee voted to approve the 
wording of Section Five before considering Bingham’s final version of 
Section One.45  Thus, the grant of congressional power preceded the full 
definition of the rights Congress would receive the power to enforce. 
Before the change, Bingham had repeatedly emphasized on the 
floor of Congress that a lack of power in Congress to effectuate and 
enforce the rights already contained in the Constitution had permitted the 
States to defy their duty to uphold those rights.46  He attributed that lack 
of power to the original framers’ decision to protect slavery, a protection 
inconsistent with effectuating the Bill of Rights, privileges and 
immunities, and due process against the states.47  After the change, 
Bingham told the House that the first section was designed to give 
Congress “power to do what hitherto it had possessed no power to 
accomplish. . . . to protect by national law the privileges and immunities 
of all the citizens of the republic and the inborn rights of every person 
within its jurisdiction whenever the same shall be abridged or denied by 
the unconstitutional acts of any State.”48 
A demotion of the importance of congressional power or the reach 
of it receives no support from the historical record.49  One comment that 
 
time as a positive restriction upon the powers of the States, consistent with the restrictions that Chief 
Justice Marshall appeared to require in Barron v. Baltimore). 
 45. Id. at 113. 
 46. Id. at 84-85 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034, 1064, 1088 (1866)). 
 47. Id. at 87 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.  1089-90 (1866)). 
 48. Id. at 129-130 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866)).  James notes that 
“a comparison of his remarks at this time with those made in February in explanation of his original 
amendment clearly demonstrates that his purpose had remained unchanged.”  Id. at 130 (footnote 
omitted). 
 49. The Boerne Court’s reliance upon the unfavorable reception the prototype received from 
Congress as explaining the removal of congressional power from Section One and hence its 
weakening, is not borne out by the record of the actions taken and the debates surrounding them.  
The first version in December 1865 was referred to the newly created Joint Committee.  JAMES, 
supra note 2, at 47-48.  The February referral to the House was withdrawn by Bingham because of a 
failure to have the House approve considering it under a special order of business.  James recounts 
that a shrewd Stevens counseled recommitment to Committee so the Joint Committee could 
maintain control of the calendar when it was brought up.  Id. at 83.  After Johnson vetoed the 
Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, Bingham introduced the Amendment again as a source for the 
congressional power Johnson had denied existed.  Id. at 84-85.  At that time, the Democrats and 
other opponents argued against it either as a superfluity (all the rights being already guaranteed, 
with Bingham vigorously noting the Supreme Court’s refusal to recognize the enforceability of 
those rights or Congress’s power to effectuate them) or as a radical centralization of power in the 
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might lend credence to a desire to weaken the congressional power was 
made by a Democratic opponent to the Amendment.  In earlier floor 
debates, Andrew Rogers of New Jersey, a member of the Joint 
Committee (who had voted against reporting out that proposal50), 
attacked the prototype of Section One of the Amendment as a move to 
centralize power unduly.  He argued that rather than increase public 
unrest by amending the Constitution, Congress should be content to 
leave enforcement of the rights contained in the Constitution to the 
court, as in the past.51  Bingham had already pointed out that the courts 
had denied to themselves the power to enforce the rights against the 
states, which is why Bingham emphasized the need for Congress to have 
power – the lack of which he claimed as a cause of the War.52  Rogers 
repeated many the same arguments on the last day of debate on the full 
multi-section Amendment.53  He decried the force of the Amendment to 
make the Civil Rights Act of 1866 constitutional; hence, he objected to 
congressional powers to define and enforce rights against the states.54  
By objecting to the amendment’s power to do this, he appears to support 
the conclusion that the power for Congress to do what he had earlier 
wished kept solely in the province of the courts was indeed intended to 
be vested.  Although not solely based upon his objections to Sections 
One and Five, Rogers’ vote against the Amendment indicates he did not 
see any sufficient weakening of the powers it contained.55 
Consistent with his declarations during the debates on the 
Amendment, Bingham recalled in 1871 that the final form of Section 
One embraced more, not less, than his original proposition, because it 
 
national government, to the derogation of state authority (a concern about national power generally, 
not about congressional power specifically, to supplant the states because all legislation could be 
about life, liberty, or property, a charge that Bingham again vigorously refuted by noting the power 
was with respect to rights contained in the Constitution already that were not being enforced or 
enforceable against the states).  Id. at 85-87.  To prevent a failure to pass by the two-thirds margin 
necessary, Bingham moved to table and it was returned to committee.  This motion was a 
Republican led and passed motion, and James notes that some in favor of it wanted the Senate to 
handle the representation issue first.  Id. at 87. The redraft occurred, as noted above, as part of a 
single restructuring of the multiple proposals before the Congress that needed to be addressed by 
constitutional amendment. 
 50. JAMES, supra note 2, at 82-83 (stating the Rogers voted against reporting the February 
version). 
 51. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. Appx. 133 (1866) (printing the speech given 
immediately after Bingham’s speech at 1034). 
 52. CONG. GLOBE  39th Cong. 1st Sess. 1034 (1866). 
 53. JAMES, supra note 2, at 129 (citing CONG. GLOBE,  39th Cong. 1st Sess. 2538-2539 
(1866)).  Rogers was primarily concerned about centralizing power in the national government.  Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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affirmatively ensured that the states would be subject to the Bill of 
Rights in contravention to earlier Supreme Court precedent in Barron 
and followed the advice of Barron to state a specific limitation upon the 
states’ powers and accord Congress the stated power.56  He noted that 
the Amendment was an “express prohibition on every State of the 
Union, which may be enforced under existing laws of Congress, and 
such other laws for their better enforcement as Congress may make.”57 
Second, the alteration in Section One, setting the rights out starkly, 
has great rhetorical power and strengthens the grant of rights.  The 
change could well have been designed to enhance the status of the rights, 
rather than to diminish Congress’s ability to recognize and enforce 
them.58  Third, the change makes the rights self-executing, rather than 
dependent upon Congress alone to give them meaning.59  The rights 
accorded cannot be ignored by any branch – including the Court – but 
are the responsibility of each branch of government to ensure.  Making 
the Court responsible as well is hardly proof that Congress removed its 
own responsibility or intended to diminish it drastically.  The entire 
design seems aimed at increasing the reach, meaning, and reality of the 
sweeping grant of rights that generated the Amendment itself.60  Coupled 
 
 56. Id. at 104-105 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. Appx. 84-85 (1871)). 
 57. Id. at 106 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. Appx. 84  (1871)). 
 58. Steven A. Engel, Note, The McCulloch Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment: City of 
Boerne v. Flores and the Original Understanding of Section 5, 109 YALE L.J. 115, 133 (1999) (“The 
alterations to the original Bingham version speak to the issues of state action and judicial 
enforcement, but they do not provide any support for a narrowing of Congress’s power to enforce 
the amendment's constitutional guarantees.”). 
 59. See Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 16, at 912 (arguing that the 
Fourteenth Amendment “was an affirmative exercise of constitutional authority, and its framers 
understood it to be a self-executing guarantee of civil rights”); Engel, supra note 58, at 125-26 
(“[S]ome Republicans criticized the text for its exclusive dependence on Congress as the protector 
of constitutional liberties.  Rather than incorporating substantive rights into the Constitution, the 
amendment merely granted Congress the power to pass legislation to protect those rights.  As 
Representative Hotchkiss argued, ‘This amendment proposes to leave it to the caprice of Congress; 
and your legislation upon the subject would depend upon the political majority of Congress . . . .’”) 
(citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. at 1095 (1866)). 
 60. See text accompanying notes 35 to 51 supra.  See McConnell, supra note 31, at 178 n.151 
(“[F]lack argued that the change from the Bingham draft to the final version was ‘a mere change in 
dress, but not in meaning.’  He stated that Bingham, the author of both versions, ‘kept the same 
object in view, and thought that the section, as finally reported and adopted, was as strong as the 
first one, and intended it to . . . confer the same powers upon Congress.’  He denied that Congress 
was limited to ‘corrective’ legislation and maintained that ‘Congress was unquestionably 
empowered to define or declare, by law, what rights and privileges should be secured to all 
citizens.’” (citing HORACE FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 65, 68, 81 
(1908)); Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 16, at 913-14  (“Congress’s 
purpose in adopting a revised version of the amendment partially explains why the original version 
was worded as a delegation of authority.  Congressman John A. Bingham noted that the purpose of 
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with its assuring or reaffirming congressional power to enact legislation 
such as the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, a truncating of congressional 
powers to protect only those rights that Court interpretation made clear 
pre-existed that legislation makes little sense.61 
Structurally, the Section Five62 power reflects a significant 
conceptual change in congressional powers.  First, Section Five 
enumerates a positive power to legislate for individual rights.63  The 
Article I Section Eight enumerated powers do not relate to rights, but to 
governing a nation.  Article I Section Nine contains prohibited powers, a 
number of them designed to protect rights of individuals or prerogatives 
of states.64  The Bill of Rights restricts the powers of Congress to 
legislate in ways infringing upon those declared rights.65 
 
his proposed amendment was to arm Congress with the constitutional authority to enforce the Bill of 
Rights. . . .  To fill this gap in the governmental guarantee of fundamental rights, Bingham worded 
his proposed amendment as an express delegation of congressional authority to enforce civil rights.  
However, the proposed amendment was changed at the behest of Congressman Giles W. Hotchkiss 
of New York.  Hotchkiss complained that by merely empowering Congress to enact laws for the 
protection of civil rights at some future date, the proposal actually left the citizen unprotected. . . . 
Hotchkiss wanted civil rights ‘secured by a constitutional amendment that legislation could not 
override.’  He sought an amendment that did more than merely authorize legislation; one that was 
self-executing, so that the protection of citizens’ rights would not have to depend upon the 
uncertainty of future legislation.  He added, ‘Then if the gentleman wishes to go further, and 
provide by laws of Congress for the enforcement of these rights, I will go with him.’”) (internal 
footnotes omitted). 
 61. McConnell states that he finds no contrary authority before Boerne arguing that the 
change of congressional authority from Section One to Section Five was intended to and did 
effectuate a diminution in the substance of the power Congress intended to accord itself, particularly 
with respect to the substitution of the term “enforce” for “secure,” upon which this argument would 
have to hinge.  McConnell, supra note 31, at 178 (“The pertinent question, which the Boerne Court 
failed to address, is how any of these changes diminished the power of Congress.  Two of the 
changes (switching the verb in Section Five from ‘secure’ to ’enforce’ and changing the standard of 
review from ‘necessary and proper’ to ‘appropriate’) were mere changes in nomenclature, with no 
substantive significance.”). 
 62. The similar Section Two in the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments also reflect these 
changes.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2. 
 63. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 784 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“Viewed in its proper perspective, § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment appears as 
a positive grant of legislative power, authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in fashioning 
remedies to achieve civil and political equality for all citizens.”).  See Kaczorowski, Revolutionary 
Constitutionalism, supra note 16, at 915, 918, 925 (demonstrating that the Amendment was 
designed to confer positive power, through a declaration of rights as positive law, and to empower 
Congress to add content to the rights so granted, rather than to limit the scope of those rights). 
 64. There is an awful exception in Clause One, designed to prevent Congress from prohibiting 
the slave trade until 1808, although it was thought to protect state powers.  See Barron v. Mayor and 
City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 248 (1833) (“[Article 1, section 9] restrictions . . . are 
obviously intended for the exclusive purpose of restraining the exercise of power by the 
departments of the general government . . . . The ninth section having enumerated, in the nature of a 
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Section Five, conversely, accords Congress a primary role as a 
bulwark of, not a potential threat to, individual rights.66  It is a 
fundamental reconception of role both with respect to the states67 and 
with respect to the legislative branch as being suited to exercise national 
power to secure individual liberties.  Congress’s reimagining of its role 
pursuant to these powers also enabled it to use the Commerce Clause as 
a vehicle for protecting the Fourteenth Amendment-type rights in the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.68 
 
bill of rights, the limitations intended to be imposed on the powers of the general government, the 
tenth proceeds to enumerate those which were to operate on the state legislatures.”). 
 65. Barron, 32 U.S. at 250 (“Serious fears were extensively entertained that those powers 
which the patriot statesmen, who then watched over the interests of our country, deemed essential to 
union, and to the attainment of those invaluable objects for which union was sought, might be 
exercised in a manner dangerous to liberty.  In almost every convention by which the constitution 
was adopted, amendments to guard against the abuse of power were recommended.  These 
amendments demanded security against the apprehended encroachments of the general government 
– not against those of the local governments.”) (emphasis added).  Cf. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552 
(“Only such existing rights were committed by the people to the protection of Congress as came 
within the general scope of the authority granted to the national government” and the Bill of Rights 
“left the authority of the States just where they found it, and added nothing to the already existing 
powers of the United States.”). 
  Note that Republican ideology deemed the rights in the body of the Constitution and the 
bill of rights to apply to the states, but to have been unenforceable under the 1787 Constitution. 
 66. It is therefore not surprising that the 39th Congress looked to the powers granted from the 
runaway slave clause’s (U.S. CONST., art. IV, sec. 2, cl. 3) positive rights statement and duty 
imposition to urge that Congress should now be explicitly given the power to enforce rights on 
behalf of individuals.  See infra notes 67 to 81 and accompanying text. 
 67. See Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 16. 
 68. Congress had serious debates over using only the Section Five power in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, fearing the limited scope of its Court-interpreted reach, despite its being a more 
intuitively proper source of the powers sought to be exercised.  See Rebecca E. Zeitlow, Belonging, 
Protection and Equality: The Neglected Citizenship Clause and the Limits of Federalism, 62 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 281, 293-94 (2000).  The Commerce Power’s reach, and applicability because of the 
negative impact private discrimination had on interstate commerce, carried the day in Congress, and 
eventually in the Court.  See id. (citing A Bill to Eliminate Discrimination in Public 
Accommodations Affecting Interstate Commerce, 1963: Hearings on S. 1732 Before the Senate 
Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong. 252 (1964)); id at n.80 (testimony of Attorney General Robert 
Kennedy that “the law would be ‘clearly constitutional’ under the Commerce Clause, but not clearly 
under the Fourteenth Amendment” (citing Hearings on S. 1732 Before the Senate Comm. on 
Commerce, 88th Cong. 28)); id. at n.81 (comments of Senator Pastore: “I believe in this bill, 
because I believe in the dignity of man, not because it impedes our commerce . . . . I like to feel that 
what we are talking about is a moral issue, . . . . And that morality, it seems to me, comes under the 
14th amendment . . . [and] equal protection of the law.” (citing Hearings on S. 1732 Before the 
Senate Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong 252)); id. (comments of Senator Monroney, “a Democratic 
Senator sympathetic with the policy of the law, worried about the use of the Commerce Clause ‘on 
matters which have been for more than 170 years thought to be within the realm of local control . . . 
. [If] we pass this bill, even though the end we seek is good, I wonder how far we are stretching the 
Constitution.’” (citing Hearings on S. 1732 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong. 66-
67)). 
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Before the Civil War Amendments, Congress’s powers with respect 
to individual rights were more negative powers, limits upon other 
powers that might be exercised to impinge upon those declared rights.  
Dred Scott made clear that the Fifth Amendment held “a total absence of 
power” in Congress to legislate with respect to property and liberty, even 
within the federal sphere.69  The only legislative power “in favor of” 
rights that had been upheld was the power to legislate on fugitive slaves, 
because the Constitution had conferred a “power coupled with a duty” 
on the federal government, in the judgment of the Court.70  John 
Bingham decried that “it has been the want of the Republic that there 
 
  In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,  379 U.S. 241 (1964), the Court upheld 
the constitutionality of the public accommodations law as within Congress’s Commerce Clause 
powers. 
 69. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 450 (1857) (finding in the Fifth 
Amendment a “total absence of power” in Congress with respect to property and liberty, precluding 
Congress from abolishing slavery in the territories and thus effectively freeing slaves brought into 
that territory). 
  Recently, scholars have claimed that the second phrase of the Necessary and Proper 
clause, correctly understood, accords Congress power to legislate affirmatively to guarantee the 
rights in the Bill of Rights, arguing that they are “other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.  See Huhn, supra note 43, at 543-
45 (arguing that ensuring that federal power is exercised consistent with limitations on that power 
from the Bill of Rights is included in the phraseology “all other powers vested,” but recognizing 
there is no specific enumerated grant of power).  However, it does not appear that Congress or the 
Court took such a power seriously before the Civil War; Representative Wilson’s argument (see 
infra note 63) appears to be a departure from previous conduct and arguments.  (See Bingham’s 
argument at CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866), infra note 52).  Although I do not 
dispute Professor Huhn’s conclusion, perhaps only in a post-Section Five (and post-New Deal) 
regime would that understanding be comprehensible as a principle of constitutional structure.  The 
pre-Civil War practice of American government does not appear to incorporate that understanding 
in the powers exercised by Congress or the relations between Congress and the Court with respect 
to protecting individual rights and liberties, especially those not specifically defined as opposed to 
those stated in ways needing interpretation.  Cf. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 539; U.S. CONST. art. IV.  On the 
other hand, Robert Post and Reva Siegel point out that the pre-Reconstruction Amendments Courts 
were not strong in imposing judicial exclusivity on interpreting constitutional meaning, leaving 
room for Congress through the necessary and proper clause.  Post & Siegel, supra note 31.  But 
examples of legislation to enforce positive individual rights as distinct from legislation connected to 
enumerated powers in the body of the Constitution, other than the ill-fated Missouri Compromise, 
do not come readily to hand. 
 70. In what is probably a reference to Prigg and the limits on affirmative power that could be 
inferred from it, Taney went on to state: “The only power [over slave property] conferred [on 
Congress by the Constitution] is the power coupled with the duty of guarding and protecting the 
owner in his rights.”  Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 452. 
  For instance, the Fugitive Slave Act, using federal agents nominally to protect the 
“property” of slaveholders that had crossed state lines, was tethered to the judicial power through 
the language of “on claim of” and the explicit duty of return in the runaway slave clause of Article 
IV, Section Two Clause Three, which clause was held to bestow power and duty on the national 
government to enforce it as a positive right.  See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 611-15 (1842). 
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was not an express grant of power in the Constitution to enable the 
whole people of every State, by congressional enactment, to enforce 
obedience to these requirements [the Bill of Rights] of the 
Constitution.”71  Even if the Bill of Rights is a source of power to 
legislate, it is so only through operation of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, rather than through a positive and explicit enumeration of 
power.72  Had such a power to legislate affirmatively with respect to 
rights been well understood, Section Five would have been unnecessary, 
or have drawn no comment.73  Michael Kent Curtis discusses the widely 
shared Republican belief, forged in the crucible of anti-slavery activism, 
that the Bill of Rights applied to the States, but that Congress was not 
empowered to enforce it by virtue of Supreme Court interpretations 
making it applicable only against the federal government (Barron) and 
disempowering Congress generally with respect to enforcing rights in 
 
 71. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866). 
 72. Using the Bill of Rights as a source for legislated restrictions on legislative grants of 
power that rely upon other enumerated powers is different from arguing that Congress has the 
power to initiate protections for individual rights drawing from nothing other than the limitations 
expressed in the Bill of Rights.  Cf. Richard Henry Seamon, Domestic Surveillance For 
International Terrorists: Presidential Power and Fourth Amendment Limits, 35 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 449, 495 at n.190 (2008) (responding to Judge Posner’s comment that Congress has no power 
analogous to Section Five to enforce the Fourth Amendment by arguing that once Congress grants 
the power in legislation to conduct surveillance, the Necessary and Proper clause entitled Congress 
to limit that authority in line with its interpretation of Fourth Amendment limits). 
 73. See supra note 68.  And, in introducing the Fourteenth Amendment onto the floor of the 
Senate, Senator Howard explicitly explained the view of the need for congressional power that had 
not otherwise been granted and would not otherwise be expected to be read in through the second 
clause of the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Huhn, supra note 43, at 545 n.48 (quoting CONG. 
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765-66 (1866)).  Senator Howard stated: 
Now, sir, there is no power given in the Constitution to enforce and to carry out any of 
these guarantees [of the Bill of Rights].  They are not powers granted by the Constitution 
to Congress, and of course do not come within the sweeping clause of the Constitution 
authorizing Congress to pass all laws necessary and proper for carrying out the foregoing 
or granted powers, but they stand simply as a bill of rights in the Constitution, without 
power on the part of Congress to give them full effect; while at the same time the States 
are not restrained from violating the principles embraced in them except by their own 
local constitutions, which may be altered from year to year.  The great object of the first 
section of this amendment is, therefore, to restrain the power of the States and compel 
them at all times to respect these great fundamental guarantees. How will it be done 
under the present amendment?  As I have remarked, they are not powers granted to 
Congress, and therefore it is necessary, if they are to be effectuated and enforced, as they 
assuredly ought to be, that additional power should be given to Congress to that end.  
This is done by the fifth section of this amendment, which declares that “the Congress 
shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation the provisions of this article.” 
Id. (alteration in original). 
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the Constitution (Dred Scott).74  Bingham expressed the upshot of this 
ideology when he opined that slavery, enshrined at the framing, had 
made it necessary to disable the federal government from enforcing 
rights.75  Some of the members of the 39th Congress argued a possible 
exception to this narrow reading of power, which they located in Prigg 
v. Pennsylvania.76  Others, including the main proponent of the 
Congressional Power Clause, John Bingham, were not convinced that 
such a congressional power existed or had been recognized by Prigg.77 
“Bingham’s conviction that an express enforcement provision was 
required proved correct in Ex Parte Virginia, where the Court stated, 
‘Were it not for the fifth section of the Fourteenth Amendment, there 
might be room for argument that the first section is only declaratory of 
the moral duty of the State, as was said in Commonwealth of Kentucky v. 
 
 74. CURTIS, supra note 1, at Chapter 3.  But see Kaczorowski, Revolutionary 
Constitutionalism, supra note 16, at 933-34 (“Bingham’s and Howard’s belief that a fourteenth 
constitutional amendment was necessary to give Congress authority to enforce Bill of Rights 
guarantees appears to have been a minority view among congressional Republicans.  This does not 
imply, however, that a majority viewed the Bill of Rights itself as a grant of legislative authority.  
The majority view on this question is not known, as it was not debated.  Nonetheless, a majority of 
Republicans could have rejected the notion that the Bill of Rights granted legislative authority and 
still believed that Congress could legislate to secure Bill of Rights guarantees by virtue of the 
thirteenth amendment.”) (emphasis added). 
 75. JAMES, supra note 2, at 87. 
 76. 41 U.S. 539 (1842).  During the debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1866, James Wilson of 
Iowa claimed Congress had the power to enact the legislation in accord with the theory of Prigg, 
which had recognized congressional power to enforce constitutionally guaranteed rights.  CONG. 
GLOBE, 39th Cong, 1st Sess. 1294 (1866).  He urged turning the pro-slavery arguments against 
themselves, making them into a force for good.  Id.  See Kaczorowski, Revolutionary 
Constitutionalism, supra note 16, at 933 (arguing that congressional Republicans recognized a 
“broad nationalist legal theory of constitutional interpretation which attributed to Congress 
affirmative authority to secure all rights derived from or recognized by the Constitution.  
Congressman Wilson, for example, applied this theory of constitutional interpretation to the Bill of 
Rights and declared: ‘The possession of the rights by the citizen raises by implication the power in 
Congress to provide appropriate means for their protection; in other words, to supply the needed 
remedy . . . . . The power is with us to provide the necessary protective remedies.  If not, from 
whom shall they come?  From the source interfering with the right?  Not at all. . . .’  Citing the 
Supreme Court decision in Prigg v. Pennsylvania as authority, Wilson insisted, ‘That is the doctrine 
laid down by the courts.  There can be no dispute about this.’” (first omission in original)).  John 
Bingham disagreed that the power existed, hence his urgency in proposing the Fourteenth 
Amendment and his focus on congressional power in the initial draft offered in February 1866.  Id.; 
see Zeitlow, supra note 68, at 325-26 (“Throughout the ratification debates, Republican supporters 
of the Fourteenth Amendment referred to Prigg to argue that Section 1 of the Amendment, 
including the Citizenship Clause, gave Congress implied powers to protect freed slaves.  The 
Framers intended to turn Prigg on its head, protecting the rights of those freed from slavery with the 
very powers once used to enslave.  Equally important, the Prigg Court had recognized 
congressional power to require private parties to return fugitive slaves even though Article IV 
referred only to state action.”) (citing Engel, supra note 58, at 139). 
 77. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866). 
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Dennison.’”78  The Framers were quite cognizant – and according to the 
Supreme Court in 1879 quite correct – that they were inhabiting new 
territory when they empowered Congress to protect rights. 
A close examination of the Court’s analysis in Prigg reveals that 
Justice Story carefully tethered Congress’s power to enforce only 
textually explicit constitutional powers that vested the judicial power 
through the language of “on claim of” and the duty of return in the 
runaway slave clause of Article IV, Section Two, Clause Three.  Story 
further cabined the power by noting that the clause, fundamental to 
creating the Union, had been conceptualized as bestowing power on the 
national government to enforce it as a positive right.79  The reasoning of 
Prigg is carefully constricted.  It is only positive rights, coupled with 
duties, that require and encompass grants of affirmative power; 
limitations on power are not recognized as affirmative grants of power: 
“[T]he national government [must have legislative power to act] in cases 
where rights are intended to be absolutely secured, and duties are 
positively enjoined by the constitution.”80  There is language that 
 
 78. Aynes, John Bingham, supra note 16, at 80 n.140 (citing Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 
347 (1879)).  See Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66 (1860) (refusing on grounds 
of federalism to enforce federal law in the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 directly to compel a state 
officer to act). 
 79. See Prigg, 41 U.S. at 611 (“Historically, it is well known, that the object of this clause 
was to secure to the citizens of the slave-holding states the complete right and title of ownership in 
their slaves, as property, in every state in the Union into which they might escape from the state 
where they were held in servitude.  The full recognition of this right and title was indispensable to 
the security of this species of property in all the slave-holding states; and indeed, was so vital to the 
preservation of their domestic interests and institutions, that it cannot be doubted, that it constituted 
a fundamental article, without the adoption of which, the Union could not have been formed.  Its 
true design was, to guard against the doctrines and principles prevalent in the non-slaveholding 
states, by preventing them from intermeddling with, or obstructing, or abolishing, the rights of the 
owners of slaves.”) (emphasis added); id. at 612 (“The clause manifestly contemplates the existence 
of a positive, unqualified right on the part of the owner of the slave, which no state law or regulation 
can in any way qualify, regulate, control or restrain.”) (emphasis added). 
 80. Id. at 620.  See also id. at 612 (“The clause manifestly contemplates the existence of a 
positive, unqualified right on the part of the owner of the slave, which no state law or regulation can 
in any way qualify, regulate, control or restrain.”) (emphasis added); id. at 614 (“the clause . . . 
implies at once a guarantee and duty”) (emphasis added); id. at 541 (“It cannot well be doubted, 
that the constitution requires the delivery of the fugitive, on the claim of the master; and the natural 
inference certainly is, that the national government is clothed with the appropriate authority and 
functions to enforce it. The fundamental principle applicable to all cases of this sort would seem to 
be, that where the end is required, the means are given; and where the duty is enjoined, the ability to 
perform it is contemplated to exist on the part of the functionaries to whom it is intrusted.”) 
(emphasis added). 
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arguably exceeds this boundary.81  However, it follows language 
coupling the right with a duty: “If, indeed, the constitution guaranties the 
right, and if it requires the delivery, . . . the fundamental principle . . . 
would seem to be, that where the end is required, the means are given; 
and where the duty is enjoined, the ability to perform it is contemplated 
to exist . . . .”82  Justice Story gives examples of constitutional grants of 
rights granting legislative power to fulfill them, but the examples are 
notably limited to powers or duties imposed in the body of the 
Constitution.83  As Justice Taney’s concurring opinion hints, those rights 
in the body of the Constitution were given to the national government as 
guardian; hence it could legislate to effectuate them by preventing states 
from interfering.84 
The Bill of Rights did not occupy such a place, being instead limits 
on the national government.85  Therefore, before the Reconstruction 
Amendments, there was no general understanding that Congress 
possessed power to legislate to secure individual rights and privileges, 
especially those framed as limitations upon governmental power, in the 
absence of a positive enumeration granting that power.  Rights were 
conceived as needing protection from, not by, Congress. 
This structure resulted, in practice, in Congress’s role being to steer 
clear of violating rights, not to be the positive declarer and protector of 
rights.  But theory pre-dating Republican theory and extant at the 1787 
founding also supported this understanding of Congress’s role.  The 
original theoretical underpinnings of the structure of constitutional 
government focused on the need to restrict Congress rather than 
empower it as a force for preserving rights.  The Court was a 
counterweight to prevent Congress from impinging upon rights.  The 
Fourteenth Amendment in Section Five drastically altered this 
theoretical construct of the Court championing individual rights by 
 
 81. Id. at 616 (“[T]he national government, in the absence of all positive provisions to the 
contrary, is bound, through its own proper departments, legislative, judicial or executive, as the case 
may require, to carry into effect all the rights and duties imposed upon it by the constitution.”). 
 82. Id. at 615 (emphasis added). 
 83. Id. at 618-20. 
 84. Id. at 628-29 (Taney, J., concurring). 
 85. See Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833) (“The powers [the people] 
conferred on this [national] government were to be exercised by itself; and the limitations on power, 
if expressed in general terms, are naturally, and, we think, necessarily applicable to the government 
created by the instrument.  They are limitations of power granted in the instrument itself; not of 
distinct governments, framed by different persons and for different purposes.  If these propositions 
be correct, the fifth amendment must be understood as restraining the power of the general 
government, not as applicable to the states.”). 
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cabining congressional power.  In the Reconstruction Amendments, the 
positive and affirmative grant of power to Congress was seen as critical 
to ensuring that the rights were indeed realized and enforced.86 
The Federalist Papers recognized the legislative power as a 
potential source of danger to individuals and to states.87  In the search for 
a governmental structure protective of liberty, it was deemed more 
important to cabin legislative power than to entrust it with defining and 
protecting individual liberties.  Because it was hard to constitute limits to 
legislative power, the principle of limited government depended upon 
the judicial power to confine the legislature to its own powers.  Without 
that check, reserving rights would be meaningless.  The courts would 
guard the Constitution and individual rights from legislative 
encroachment.88 
Broad legislative power was feared as the power to have “liberties 
exterminated.”89  The ability for majorities to override minority interests 
and rights posed significant problems for structuring a government less 
likely to wield this power.  Enumerating legislative powers was one 
method for protecting the union from the danger of the legislative 
prerogative.90  In addition, the concept was to prevent legislative power 
 
 86. See, e.g., Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 16, at 889 (“[I]n 
Barron v. Baltimore, the Supreme Court had held that the fifth amendment and presumably the 
entire Bill of Rights were limitations upon the power of the national government, not delegations of 
affirmative authority to secure fundamental rights. Consequently, neither the comity clause nor the 
Bill of Rights gave the national government authority to secure the fundamental rights of its citizens 
within the state of the citizens’ residence, even under the broad antebellum nationalist view of 
citizenship.”). 
 87. The Federalist Papers characterize the legislative power as that most dangerous to liberty, 
apt to draw “all power into its impetuous vortex” and able to usurp power and thus to interfere with 
rights.  The Federalist No. 48 (James Madison).  Acknowledging that the Necessary and Proper 
clause had excited considerable opposition as the way to “exterminate liberties,” Publius sought to 
explain the limits of the clause and touted the structural protections curbing legislative power built 
into the Constitution.  The Federalist No. 33 (Alexander Hamilton); The Federalist No. 44 (James 
Madison).  Federalist 51, drawing upon arguments first exposited in Federalist 10, noted that rights 
would be protected by the extent of the new nation and the factions it would naturally possess.  The 
Federalist No. 51 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison).  But Publius relied heavily upon the 
other branches, the states, and the people to act as guardians against such encroachment.  The 
Federalist No. 44 (James Madison). 
 88. The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 89. The Federalist No. 33 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 90. The Federalists originally argued that the limited powers afforded through Article I to 
Congress, and to the national government generally, were sufficient to protect individual rights, i.e., 
conceptualizing Article I powers as protecting rights negatively by precluding congressional 
incursion because of a lack of power.  The Federalist No. 41 (James Madison) (no power to invade 
rights because of the limitations of enumeration); The Federalist No. 44 (James Madison) (limits on 
legislative power are a “constitutional bulwark in favor of personal security and private rights” 
[referring to Article I, Section 9]); limitations on Congress exceeding its granted powers included 
REILLY_ARTICLE_FINALFINALFINAL.DOC 6/30/2009  3:42 PM 
1104 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:1081 
from encroaching on states, because the states were thought to be better 
designed to protect liberties, being closer to the people, and hence 
necessarily more responsive to their demands and needs.91  There was 
apparently no thought to accord the legislature a greater expanse of 
power to act positively on behalf of liberties; rather, the legislature was a 
source of “interferences in cases affecting personal rights.”92  The 
resources of the Framers were expended finding methods to cabin 
legislative power, not to empower it as a protector of rights. 
Even the Bill of Rights, necessitated by demands for written 
protections for fundamental liberties, was conceived as operating by 
restricting legislative and executive powers that might otherwise 
encroach on rights in the presumed exercise of enumerated powers.  
There is great rhetorical power and meaning in the first words being 
“Congress shall make no law . . . .”93 
The Court, on the other hand, was thought to be a protector of 
rights, including against legislative encroachment.  The balance of 
powers struck was designed to limit legislative power within itself and to 
enforce those limitations through the “least dangerous” branch, the 
Court.94  The Bill of Rights similarly entrusted the Court with the 
protection of those liberties.95 
 
the executive, the judiciary, the people, and the state legislatures jealously guarding their own 
prerogatives); The Federalist No. 45 (James Madison) (the powers delegated are “few and defined” 
with states retaining powers concerning the “lives, liberties and properties of the people”); The 
Federalist No. 46 (James Madison) (any infringement of liberties would be opposed by the states); 
The Federalist No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (no need to except rights from “powers not granted” 
because the people retain those powers; the Constitution itself is a bill of rights).  Other methods 
included separating powers (The Federalist Nos. 48 (James Madison), 51 (Alexander Hamilton or 
James Madison)), using a bicameral form of legislature, relatively short terms of office (The 
Federalist No. 37), especially in the popularly elected House of Representatives (The Federalist No. 
53 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison)), equal state representation in the Senate and state 
selection of Senators (The Federalist No. 62 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison), and Senate 
ability to check factions thus preventing unjust majoritarian rule (The Federalist No. 63 (Alexander 
Hamilton or James Madison)). 
 91. The Federalist Nos. 44 (James Madison), 45 (James Madison), 46 (James Madison).  See 
Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 16, at 871 (“Prior to the Civil War, the 
states defined the status and enforced the rights of the individual.”); id. at 872 (“the states 
functioned as the primary guarantors of the fundamental rights of American citizens”). 
 92. The Federalist No. 44 (James Madison). 
 93. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 94. The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 95. See Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause and Revising 
the Slaughter-House Cases Without Exhuming Lochner: Individual Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 38 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1996) (“A bill of rights, Madison said, would give legitimacy to 
principles of liberty, help the people to internalize these values, and provide a basis for rallying 
against abuses of power.  It would also give new power to the courts.  Madison announced, with 
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Had the power to legislate to protect rights been generally 
understood, or had Congress been sanguine that the Executive and the 
Court would recognize and enforce an exercise of that power, Section 
Five would not have been deemed critical.  Yet key framers repeatedly 
refer to the grant of power as essential to achieve the goals of the 
Amendment.96  The recurrence of the grant of power in all three 
Reconstruction Amendments reinforces the inference that there was a 
felt need to make it abidingly clear that power existed, not to be denied 
by the President97 or the United States Supreme Court.98  When Section 
Five prominently reconceived Congress’s role with respect to liberty,99 it 
necessarily affected the Court’s role100 as well, restriking the balance 
between the two branches.101 
 
excessive optimism, that ‘courts of justice’ would form ‘impenetrable barriers’ against violations of 
the liberties in the Bill of Rights.”) (emphasis added) (citing 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS, A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1025, 1030-31 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971); Paul Finkelman, James 
Madison and the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant Paternity, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 301 (1990)). 
 96.  Bingham referred to the grant of power to enforce rights as in his prototype as “the most 
important issue that would come before the Congress.”  CURTIS, supra note 1, at 62 (citing CONG. 
GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 1034 (1866)).  Howard, introducing the Amendment into the Senate, 
stated that “therefore it is necessary, if [the rights of section one] are to be effectuated and enforced, 
as they assuredly ought to be, that additional power should be given to Congress to that end.  This is 
done by the fifth section of this amendment . . . .”  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 
(1866). 
 97. The 39th Congress was adopting the Fourteenth Amendment at a time when “President 
Andrew Johnson, a Democratic Conservative, actually encouraged Southern resistance through his 
policy of appeasement.  This continuing Southern hostility to the Union led Republicans and 
Southern Unionists to believe that the spirit that had led the South to secede had survived the Civil 
War.”  Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 16, at 875.  Johnson vetoed the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 citing a lack of congressional constitutional power to enact it.  See  JAMES, 
supra note 2, at 97-98. 
 98. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. 393.  Cf. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816) (holding the 
Court had power to review legislation to determine whether Congress had acted within the 
constitutional limits of its power). 
 99. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 1643, at 877 (“Because 
Northern Republicans needed to preserve their Civil War victory over state sovereignty and slavery, 
they established in law the primacy of United States citizenship and with it the primacy of 
Congress's authority to secure the rights of American citizens.”); id. at 885 (“Congressman William 
Lawrence transformed this point of political theory into a matter of practical necessity when he 
warned that congressional protection of civil rights was ‘essential to preserve the national life and 
the means of national existence.’”) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1836 (1866)).  See 
Engel, supra note 5858, at 124-25 (“Although [the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Fifth 
Amendment] were self-executing, no express grant of power to Congress provided for their 
enforcement.  Many Republicans believed the Bill of Rights and the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause bound the states, but the federal judiciary had rejected such a reading, and Congress so far 
had been powerless to enforce those guarantees.”). 
 100. By enforcing rights against the states, the Fourteenth Amendment also expanded the 
power of the Supreme Court to review state conduct and legislation to ensure it did not transgress 
these newly-created limitations upon state power.  This was an object as well as a consequence of 
REILLY_ARTICLE_FINALFINALFINAL.DOC 6/30/2009  3:42 PM 
1106 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:1081 
Even in the current restrictive view of Section Five powers, the 
balance of powers differs from the antebellum concept and practice.  
Section Five authorizes Congress to enact active and prophylactic 
protections and enforcement of critical guaranteed rights and liberties 
formerly conceived as limitations on power.102  Not only can Congress 
legislate with respect to rights – a newly conferred power in Section Five 
 
making the rights in Section One self-executing. William Wiecek, The Great Writ and 
Reconstruction: The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, in CIVIL RIGHTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY: MAJOR 
HISTORICAL INTERPRETATIONS 758-59 (Kermit Hall ed., 1987) (arguing Congress intended to 
empower the federal courts as partners in enforcing rights, and that post-Amendment history 
“reveals a consistent determination by Congress and the courts to enhance the powers and role of 
the federal courts, not to emasculate them.”).  Cf. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (limiting 
privileges and immunities in order to prevent “excessive” congressional and Court power to affect 
the states). 
 101. McConnell argues that the Framers meant to protect rights better than they had been 
protected by the Supreme Court by granting Congress this power – i.e., that the Section Five grant 
of power alters the power interrelationships between the branches of the federal government as well. 
See McConnell, supra note 31, at 176 (“[The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment] were not 
content to leave the specification of protected rights to judicial decision.”).  See Engel, supra note 
58, at 117 (“While the Court may retain the last word, the judicial reading obscures the Framers’ 
conviction that it would be Congress, and not the courts, that would be the first reader, and primary 
enforcer, of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The amendment speaks in open generalities not because 
the Framers naively believed the judiciary might ascertain a definite meaning behind those words, 
but because they were interested in granting to the national government broad discretion to protect 
civil liberties against state infringement.  Rather than seeking to codify a definite set of rights, the 
Framers undertook to grant future Congresses the discretion to protect civil liberties, as they might 
understand them, against state infringement.”); id. at 122 (“[A]llowing both the judiciary and the 
legislature to compete with the states in expanding the zone of liberty reflects the best traditions of 
our constitutional government . . . . Rather than threatening the federalist balance, granting Congress 
an increased role in protecting national liberties holds true to a federalism that recognizes a national 
government of enumerated and limited powers.”); id. at 124  (“To Republican eyes, the amendment 
would grant the national government the powers that had been withheld – either by the states’ 
jealousy of national power at the Founding or by subsequent misinterpretation by the courts – to 
enforce the obligations of the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.”).  Cf. Joseph Blocher, 
Amending the Exceptions Clause, 92 MINN. L. REV. 971 (2008) (noting how later-enacted 
amendments alter the constitutional text to accommodate them, for instance how the First 
Amendment explicit restriction of congressional power [“Congress shall make no law”] amends 
Article I, and also restricts executive power with respect to those rights, amending Article II). 
 102. Boerne, 521 U.S. 507.  The Court’s opinion begins with the theory of enumerated powers 
(at 516) and proceeds to find Congress has the enumerated power to act upon the limiting “self-
executing” provisions of Section 1 of the Amendment by virtue of the enumerated Section 5 power: 
“All must acknowledge that § 5 is ‘a positive grant of legislative power’ to Congress.”  Id. at 517 
(citation omitted).  The court then notes that the enforcement power has wide, but not unlimited 
application: “Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the 
sweep of Congress’s enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not 
itself unconstitutional . . . .”  Id. at 518.  In so acting, “[w]hen Congress acts within its sphere of 
power and responsibilities, it has not just the right but the duty to make its own informed judgment 
on the meaning and force of the Constitution,” although Boerne reserves ultimate interpretive power 
as to the substance of a constitutional guarantee to the Court, which Congress may not alter.  Id. at 
535. 
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– but it can also legislate prophylactic remedies, effectively going 
beyond current Court pronouncement when necessary.  As Boerne notes, 
“All must acknowledge that § 5 is ‘a positive grant of legislative power’ 
to Congress,” and that the “sweep of Congress’s enforcement power” is 
wide, if not unlimited.  Congress, because of the Section, has power, and 
hence “not just the right but the duty to make its own informed judgment 
on the meaning and force of the Constitution.”103  Pragmatically, this 
active role has developed into a relationship between the Court and 
Congress that Robert Post and Reva Siegel refer to as policentric.104  The 
two branches participate mutually in recognizing threats to rights, the 
reach of those rights and methods of protecting them.105  Using the 
methods peculiarly suited to their respective institutional competencies 
and roles, the conversation results in mutually recognized new 
understandings of rights and their enforcement.106  Congress can 
continue to emphasize noticing and correcting infringements when they 
are systemic.  Systemic wrongs are the least likely to result in a 
blameworthy actor causing harm, and thus they are difficult to identify, 
fight, and correct through court action.  Congress alone has the ability to 
respond with a method that can prevent, provide accessible enforcement 
mechanisms, and remedy these wrongs.107  Congress thus still occupies a 
place affirmatively designed to make it a protector of liberties, not 
simply their chief predator. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Legal and political theory about the appropriate role of Congress 
with respect to identifying, protecting and enforcing personal liberties 
changed significantly from the time of the original framing in 1787 to 
the time of the framing of the Reconstruction Amendments.  Congress 
was originally conceived of as a predator on personal rights, leading to a 
legal regime of enumerated powers coupled with rights provisions that 
were considered solely as a source negating congressional power.  By 
 
 103. Id. at 517, 518, 535 (emphasis added). 
 104. Post & Siegel, supra note 31. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id.  Although Post and Siegel may fear that current Court cases have reduced Congress’s 
role in the policentric relationship unduly and inappropriately, pragmatically, the conversation 
continues. 
 107. Id.; see also Denise C. Morgan & Rebecca E. Zietlow, The New Parity Debate: Congress 
and Rights of Belonging, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1347, 1350 (2005) (arguing that “Congress has a 
unique and important role to play in providing a nationally uniform baseline of rights of belonging,” 
and “that only Congress can adequately protect those rights”). 
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the time of the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress was 
seen as necessary to recognizing and enforcing rights, and was 
affirmatively granted a positive power to do so through the operation of 
Section Five. 
Legal and political realities of the time support this reconception of 
Congress and significant grant of additional powers.  The framing of the 
Fourteenth Amendment proceeded at a time when the Executive was 
seen both as having too much power and as affirmatively interfering 
with the work and goals of Reconstruction, especially with respect to the 
rights of freedmen and the quashing of the Slave Power, as necessary to 
lasting peace, stability, and Union.  The Amendment was designed to 
and did shift power over Reconstruction to the Congress.  One aspect of 
that shift was enshrined in the alteration of the pardoning power 
incorporated into Section 3.  Hence, the Amendment effectuated a power 
shift between Congress and the Executive that empowered Congress 
relative to the Executive. 
Similarly, the failure of the original Constitution to maintain the 
Union and protect citizens and rights was squarely acknowledged as 
having deep roots in slavery.  The 39th Congress perceived that not only 
had former as well as the current Executive fallen under the sway of the 
Slave Power, but that the Supreme Court had also been influenced, that 
“slavery had ‘polluted’ and ‘defiled’ the judiciary.”108  The Supreme 
Court’s role in stripping Congress of any power to enforce rights, even 
federally on the basis of the Fifth Amendment and consistently with 
nearly a century of practice, was much on the minds of the Framers, 
whose final amendment explicitly overruled the worst aspects of Dred 
Scott in the citizenship clause of Section One and the empowerment 
clause of Section Five.109  The Court had also rendered states impotent to 
protect rights of alleged fugitive slaves by finding an exclusive 
congressional power coupled with a duty.  The inconsistency of these 
two decisions, sharing in common only the effect of protecting slavery, 
made the Framers at best skeptical of the Court’s role in protecting 
liberties, and hence more determined to wrest power in that arena for the 
Congress as well.  The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were 
exceedingly cautious because their deeply held values and views had 
 
 108. CURTIS, supra note 1, at 83. 
 109. Note that John Bingham, one of the greatest champions of increased congressional power 
as a necessity, also believed that the Supreme Court had misinterpreted the Constitution, requiring 
written correction in addition to simply empowering Congress.  Id. at 62.  Thus, Bingham appears 
to believe that although constitutional power might not survive Supreme Court denial, constitutional 
principle was not changed by such misinterpretation. 
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been trampled consistently, and their use of precedent had been twisted, 
grants of power read out and successes in altering outcomes by both 
statutes and amendment rendered null.110  They knew from experience 
that only great clarity and forceful grants of power, done redundantly to 
reinforce their purpose, would work.111  Misconstruction was an 
acknowledged problem.112 
Thus, skeptical of the Court as a protector of rights, Congress 
provided to itself the constitutional power to protect rights and guard 
against misconstruction.  Whether or not the Framers focused upon the 
exact new parameters of relative powers, it cannot be denied that they 
did focus on the need to enhance congressional powers.  That 
enhancement, into arenas not before recognized as belonging to 
Congress, of necessity altered the balance between the Court and 
Congress as well. 
In addition to its well-recognized changes to individual rights and 
federal-state powers, the Fourteenth Amendment also effectuated a 
change, practically and ideologically, in the former balance among the 
three branches of national power.  The Framers and ratifiers did indeed 
create both a Union that had not yet been fashioned, and a Constitution 
that is dramatically different in where and how it strikes the balance of 
power on behalf of liberty. 
 
 110. Richard L. Aynes, Ink Blot or Not: The Meaning of Privileges and/or Immunities, 11 J. 
CONST. L. 1295, 1305-07 (forthcoming 2009). 
 111. CURTIS, supra note 1, at 141 (quoting Lyman Trumbull in a speech in Illinois that the 
“[14th Amendment’s §1 is] an unnecessary provision perhaps, since the abolition of slavery and the 
passage of the Civil Rights Bill; still the declaration of the great principles of individual freedom 
and civil liberty cannot be too often repeated, and may well find a place in the fundamental law of 
the land”) (citing Cincinnati Commercial, Sept. 3, 1866, at 2, col.3) (emphasis added). 
 112. CURTIS, supra note 1, at 140 (giving examples showing that Republicans believed that 
even if their theory that the Thirteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 granted power 
was correct that they needed redundancy in the Constitution to ensure it, to “entrench[ ] and fortif[y] 
in the Constitution and laws by the most complete and undeniable guarantees . . . beyond all doubt 
and misconstruction”) (citing General Martindale reading the New York Sailors and Soldiers 
Convention address adopted by the convention, in Albany Evening Journal, Sept. 21, 1866, at 1, col. 
3) (emphasis added). 

